The essay analyses the activities of the imperial German Board of Archives as a form through which the 'moral conquest' (moralische Eroberung) policy was pursued in Congress Poland by the German Empire in the First World War years. Central to the argument is not only the aspect of a model incarnation of a soft-power strategy in exportation of German science to a conquered country, this being a key instrument of the peaceful conquest of Poland, but also an organic incoherence of the strategy, as refl ected in the way the Polish archives were managed. Such
identifi cation suggests that the German Empire pursued in Congress Poland activities typical of semicolonial policies. For one thing, the German administrators safeguarded against destruction the offi cial (public, state-related) documents and archival collections abandoned by the Russians, catalogued them and made them available to historians, in a professional way and on civilised terms. Otherwise, in pursuance of their particular interests, the German authorities of the General Government of Warsaw endeavoured, from a position of strength, to take over the valuable documents from the Polish archives. This venture negated, in the perception of the Polish partners, the esteem for Germany and its civilizational achievements, administering a fi nal blow to the 'moral conquest' concept.
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With the military successes of the German Empire on the Eastern Front and the displacement of the tsarist army from the Congress Poland territory, which was completed in the summer of 1915, it was resolved in Berlin that a territorial unit, which is known today as the Generalgouvernement Warschau (GGW), be established in the conquered area that formed the warfront's supply network. The openended outcome of the war determined the formation's temporary nature. Strongly infl uenced by the campaigning of General Hans Hartwig von Beseler, the Governor-General, the decision-makers of German foreign policy coined the idea that the Congress Poland territory should be made a sovereign state allied with the German Empire based on economic, military, and cultural bonds, thus forming part of the German Mitteleuropa, ready for further inevitable wrestle with the Romanov Empire. through school, language, religion, and -subsequently -arts, literature, and science. 4 Taking this interpretation into account, this essay analyses the activities of the Imperial German Board of Archives as a means of implementation of the moralische Eroberung policy in Congress Poland by the conquerors. Apart from an instance of model operationalisation of the soft power strategy in the exportation of German science to the conquered country, the core of the argument extends to identifying an organic incoherence of the said strategy, as refl ected in the management of Polish archives. This observation would imply that the German Empire pursued in Congress Poland activities characteristic of semicolonial policy.
In operation from 1915 to 1918, the German Board of Archives has attracted no special attention among historians, whether Polish or German, although its Director, Adolf Warschauer, himself offered a valuable point of departure as he submitted a synthetic description, being a subjective view, of the structure he managed. 5 This and his subsequent books, written on the spot, in the fi rst years following the abrupt collapse of the German rule in Poland in November 1918, 6 joined the multiple memoirist pieces published at that time in Europe. 7 Such was Warschauer's intention as well: like the other prominent administrators of the GGW, he felt compelled to put his thoughts into writing. However, compared to the publications by other decision-makers, 8 Warschauer's studies were highly unbiased. Three factors were underlying: (i) his profession as a historian; (ii) his personal moral habitus; and, (iii) the matter he described. The activities pursued by the German Board of Archives implied a number of aspects benefi cial to the other party, that is, to Poland.
This positive side was appreciated by Kazimierz Kaczmarczyk (1878 -1966 , Polish historian and Director of the Archives in Poznań. In the period of growing political tension between the Weimar Republic and the Second Republic of Poland, he did not hesitate to talk appreciatively of the activities pursued during the First World War by the German archivists' team led by Warschauer. 9 in Deutschland (Paderborn et al., 2002) (1917) , 560-1. Warschauer endeavoured to act in a conciliatory manner in the fi eld of science as well. A few original records he found at the Archives of Historical Records inspired him to write an essay on the national identity of Copernicus. Whilst avoiding a defi nite opinion, he demonstrated the infertility of the historical German-Polish dispute around the great astronomer's nationality, he instead emphasised how fertilising this man's activities were for science and arts in both nations; see Adolf Warschauer, 'Die Geschichte des Streits um die Nationalität des Kopernikus', Mitteilungen der Historischen Gesellschaft für Posen, 1 (1925), 1-25.
Kaczmarczyk wrote an article based on a now-perished, voluminous source material that was produced in 1915-18 by the Archives Board in Warsaw but got lost then on, in the abyss of the Second World War. 10 This circumstance caused that historians have so far tended to give the German Archives Board a wide berth.
11 Among Polish historians, the methodological diffi culties coincided with the political factor. In the Cold War realities, historians active in communist Poland could propose no positive evaluation of German political actors of the Hohenzollern empire's time. It was only in the second decade after the 1989/90 transition that the activities of the German Board of Archives was subjected to historical analysis. The author of this words has identifi ed the Board's Director as the closest associate of General von Beseler's in the GGW; 12 Stefan Lehr wrote a study on Warschauer and the Archives Board. Central to the latter is a dispute with Polish historians over the ownership of archival materials generated in the South East Prussia and New East Prussia (Süd-/Neuostpreußen) between 1793 and 1806, which resulting from the Tilsit Treaties of 1807 were transferred to the Duchy of Warsaw. As Lehr aptly concludes, the criteria employed by the German party to the dispute, based whereon they have put forth their claims, were ambiguous: they referred to complementariness of archives, to the territorial principle, or else, to the records' original provenance. (Warszawa, 1956 ), 265 ff. The other part of the fi les, which had been hidden by the Poles at the Sokolnicki Fort, to be rescued from the Germans entering Warsaw in September 1939, was found by the Germans and taken away to Potsdam (see ibidem, 238), where the records were eventually destroyed by fi re resulting from the Allied Forces' bombing in spring 1945.
11 A prominent example is the altered profi le of a dissertation: occupationrelated policies in Poland into Berlin's diplomatic policies toward Poland, being the case with Werner Conze, Polnische Nation und deutsche Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Köln and Graz, 1958) . 12 See Arkadiusz Stempin, Próba 'moralnego podboju' Polski przez cesarstwo niemieckie w latach I wojny światowej (Warszawa, 2014) . 13 See Lehr, 'Die "Rückforderung"', 47-66.
I GENERAL HANS H. VON BESELER'S MORAL CONQUEST POLICY
Beseler, who appeared in Warsaw as a thorough dilettante in Polish affairs, pretty quickly came to understanding that by merely administering the territory under occupation, he would not win Poles over as prospective allies in the formation of a common anti-Russian front. Given the fact that no clearly defi ned future of the Polish lands under occupation had been decided in Berlin, he resolved to grant his subjects a number of concessions in the area of culture and national symbolism, which came across their national aspirations. Thereby, he incarnated the paradigm of occupational rule, which, "using soft and camoufl aged means of violence", impose "recognition of its authority" and "confi rmation of the mandate to exercise the power".
14 Legitimation of authority in an alien country is founded not only upon the ruler's will to rule but also on the readiness of the governed to accept such power and authority. An attitude of this sort is generable by submitting interesting offerings to the governed community, so as to arouse among them appropriate response, with inherent readiness to cooperate. 15 This strategy was characteristic of semicolonial policy, and tested before the war by the German Empire with respect to the Ottoman Empire (in the Balkans) as well as the Chinese colony. In China and Turkey, as part of the moral capture strategy, politicalcultural projects were mainly pushed forward in the area of extension of university contacts and strengthening the German education and school system in the diaspora.
In the GGW, Beseler, together with political-and-cultural freedoms he granted, which abolished the rationing of uttering the national identity by Poles, implemented the German Empire's moral conquest policy. 17 The catalogue of his concessions was quite appreciable. The reestablishment of a Warsaw University was the major step; in contrast to the period before 1914, when the university was deemed completely Russifi ed, was now transferred to a team of Poles. 18 A no less spectacular step Beseler made towards Poles was a consent for their commemoration of the 125th anniversary of the adoption of the Third-of-May Constitution (celebrated 3 May 1916). This opened the fl oodgates of permits for celebrating by Poles of a series of other national holidays and historical anniversaries, mainly with an antiRussian cutting edge. Moreover, the German authorities allowed the Polish language to be used in schools and GGW administration, as part of their political-cultural strategy; Prince Zdzisław Lubomirski, -including Congress Poland (described in Germany as Russisch-Polen), and the south of Europe -including the Balkans, along with the Spanish empire, then undergoing a crisis, together with its Arabic heritage, were all perceived in Germany as not being part of the Western core of European civilisation. The concessions made by the Governor-General did not translate into the expected effect on the Poles; they did not signifi cantly reinforce pro-German sentiments, or provide suffi cient incentives for cooperation, or even erode pro-Russian sympathies, for the pro-Polish trend in the area of culture interbred with the imperial interests of Germany. The latter implied economic pillaging of the GGW -with growing prices and dissatisfaction of the governed people -or disavowal of political postulates of Polish independence-oriented parties or factions, such as the formation of a Polish army under Polish chief command, or transferral of administrative functions within GGW to Polish hands. Otherwise, the administration-related regulations, which were intentionally meant to ensure security to the local people, exposed these people to intense oppression from the alien control apparatus. Thus, a squawking contradiction showed up, as characteristic of any semicolonial system, where a coercion strategy coexists with seduction strategies.
The incoherent policy of German occupation authorities with respect to Polish locals, analogous to any like semicolonial policy observable in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, is demonstrable also for the area controlled by the Imperial German Board of Archives. the stampeding Russians. 20 Exposed to damage or loss in the war's realities, these documents called for being professionally protected. The takeover of the GGW administration forced the new administrators to preserve the existing personal and institutional records. Such a step could also be used to elegantly retort the charge of 'German barbarians' -the phrase the Allied Powers' propaganda unceasingly juggled with. 21 Yet another aspect proved decisive in the tangle of benefi ts. Comprehensive protection of former Russian documents gave General von Beseler a vehicle that enabled him to energetically set about carrying out a mission civilisatrice in Poland and implanting the high culture of German organisation and science. Hence, three weeks after the General Government was established, Beseler resolved that a German unit be established to manage the archives. Effi cient protection of not only former Russian documents but also Polish archive resources, with modern means being extended ever since to both categories, was meant, in Beseler's concept, to demonstrate the power of the achievements of German civilisation, attaining a propaganda effect among the educated and leadership strata of Polish society. 22 As the Governor-General himself put it, the intent was to "light the torches of sciences, extinguished by Russians for long years, anew". 23 Thus, a dreamful instrument would be created for a "Germany's fruitful cultural policy abroad", and for acquiring "international sympathy" -to use, this time, the phrases of Karl Lamprecht, cofounder of the 'moral conquest' idea. 24 In today's terms, this would basically mean promotion of German science, demonstration of Germany's attractiveness as a powerful empire, in order to increase the country's prestige and infl uence in Poland. "If we do not yield to excessive ambition, Poland shall be ours, in some two or three generations' time", Beseler judged. 25 His closest advisor in Warsaw, Count Bogdan Hutten-Czapski -the promoter of Polish-German rapprochement, who was extremely infl uential in Berlin -helped Beseler maintain the conviction that his design was legitimate.
26
The formation of a German managing body for the archives required consent from the Prussian Ministry of State and Prussian state archives. Beseler requested Professor Paul Kehr, director with the latter, for "sending archivists to Warsaw with a command of Polish and Russian, who would be ready to inventory and investigate the local archival resources, whose condition is pitiful". The request was reinforced with use of a tactic argument remarking that the local archives comprise manuscripts of historical interest, priceless for German science, as they were related to the history of West Prussia and Poznań, and to the relationships between the Teutonic Order and Poland. sent to Warsaw were to take over the Prussian archives. 29 Thus, from the very beginning, with use of the magnetic force of German science and organisation, the moralische Eroberung, as a project for Warsaw, suffered severe detriment, with the mutually contradicting interests of two concepts, epitomised by the names of Beseler and Kehr, respectively. The latter regarded Adolf Warschauer as the most suitable man to take up the mission. 30 Warschauer, until then director of the State Archiv es in Danzig, had a considerable portfolio to his credit, and was reputed as an outstanding expert in the history of Poland.
31
Almost sixty-year-old man, a personality of "extensive humanistic learning", 32 Warschauer, an experienced offi cial, had fi rst to dispel the doubts related to his age and a somewhat worrying health condition 33 before he was put in offi ce in Warsaw, on 11 October 1915, as Director of the Archives. He was furnished with fabulous emolument 34 and an orderly to assist him, which attested to how privileged his offi ce was, and that the rank of the organisation established in Warsaw was high.
35 From the heights of his position, Kehr advised him that he "keep a watchful eye on the archives whose importance for Prussia is special", and to "deal carefully" with Poles. In any case, "in dubious 29 See Lehr, 'Die "Rückforderung"', 49-50. 30 (Posen, 1918) . He also had a number of scientifi c articles published to his credit, as member of the Historische Gesellschaft für Posen and co-editor with the Historische Monatsblätter für die Provinz Posen.
32 Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig Jahre, 265. 33 Warschauer was partly paralysed at the time, and therefore Beseler granted him with a special permit for his wife to accompany him while in Warsaw; otherwise, wives of German offi cials were not allowed to stay in GGW. 34 Apart from his regular wage of 7,200 German marks, traineeship bonus (600 marks), annual residential facility refund (920 marks), he was entitled tosituations, the interest of Prussia must take primacy over that of Poland": such was the general guideline advised by Kehr, with which Warschauer arrived in the city on the Vistula.
36
This was at odds with Beseler's commandment: the Governor instantly warned Warschauer against making use of even a smallest document from any of the Polish collections without his consent; he must not have any such piece sent to the Reich, Beseler remarked, also in case he has found that the Reich has the right to it. 37 Thus, Beseler started his rule in Poland by strictly observing the Hague Convention which imposed on the occupying power the obligation to protect the archives in the conquered country. 38 In order to force the director into absolute loyalty in face of the disagreement with the Berlin 'hawks', the chief administrator of the Generalgouvernement had him report directly to himself, rather than to the head of the GGW's Civil Board (the German central offi ce handling civil affairs), or Kehr; Beseler moreover installed his plenipotentiary, Count Hutten-Czapski, a loyal votary of the 'moral conquest' scheme, to assist Warschauer. The organisational subordination of the latter to the military division was externally refl ected by the obligation imposed on the historian to wear a military uniform on his offi cial trips. 39 Of higher relevance was, however, the fact that excepting Warschauer from the civil division aroused considerable consternation among the management team of GGW's Civil Board. 40 36 Lehr, 'Die "Rückforderung"', 50. 37 See Warschauer, Deutsche Kulturarbeit, 271. 38 In respect of the succession of Polish archives from the Russian resources, Beseler's stance was anchored in Article 56 of the rules-and-regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, which covered the 'laws and customs of war on land', providing that "the property … of institutions dedicated to … sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property", and forbidding "all seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden", under pain of legal proceedings; cf. Journal of Laws, 1927, No. 21, Item 161. Since the presence of the Second Reich in the Polish territory was temporary, implying no incorporation in the German Empire, any other practice of takeover and distribution of archives, such as the ones applied in the aftermath of the German-Danish, German-Austrian, or German-French war, were irrelevant in that particular situation. See All this made the Warsaw archives board peculiar against its counterpart structures in German-occupied Belgium and France, which reported to the local civil administrations. 41 Only with respect to science-related matters was the Archives Board director obligated to consult the director of the Prussian Archives. However, Beseler ensured in this way the best framework of action for his director, who could build a new structure without the necessity to bargain with the German bureaucracy in Warsaw. The Archivverwaltung beim Kaiserlichen Deutschen Generalgouvernement Warschau, which benefi ted from Beseler's personal support and assistance, was granted by him (on 11 February 1916) the right to use its own offi cial seal, and furnished with a manual of authority. 42 The latter confi rmed the superior role of the Hague Convention in taking over the care of all the archives within GGW; Beseler was made the major instance in this respect, as he was the only one to resolve the disputable ownership of documents; the competencies of director of Prussian state archives (specifi cally, Kehr) were reduced to a scolarly consulting function; the Archives Board Director was afforded the right to render the collection available to German offi ces and researchers. Furthermore, archivists were obligated to search for non-public archives -those managed or held by municipalities, foundations, churches, or families -within the GGW area; the contents of these archives was subject to scholarly classifi cation. Dissolution of the Archives Board would be the only premise for the Reich to take over all the fi les from Polish archives. 43 Warschauer was obliged by Beseler to prepare every three months a report on the activities of the institution entrusted to him. The fi rst such report, of which a total of thirteen were compiled by the end of the occupation, 44 treasures deposited at the Warsaw archives. 46 Beseler, contended at this point, personally took care about doing his part in acquiring the valuable information for Berlin; once there, the information started 'circulating its own way'. 47 Glorifi ed by his success, the general counted on a greater acceptance for his 'moral conquest' concept. But he was wrong, since the 'hawks' in Berlin focused even stronger on retrieving the Prussian archives completely -all the more so that Warschauer kept Kehr directly informed of the progress he was making in trailing these archives. As it may be judged from their extensive correspondence, 48 the Director of the Archives Boards in Warsaw served two masters, Beseler and Kehr.
Not surprisingly, though for a different reason, Kehr satisfi ed Beseler's request to send over more archivists to Warsaw, as "the load of work exceeded the potential of an individual". 49 The offer would extend to historians from Prussia, with a command of Polish and Russian and well-versed in the history of Poland. 50 Kehr, excited at the prospect, must have forwarded Beseler's request with enthusiasm so great that the request circulated as far away as the Baden Ministry of Religions and Education. 51 The linguistic and professional criteria were set quite high for the candidates, as attested by the rejection of application letters sent by some historians of renown, with no 47 56 These two Poles recognised that the German Board of Archives is driven by academic, rather than nationalistic, considerations. "An extremely industrious man, he obeyed my every single instruction", Warschauer said of Marcinkowski; "there was one exception, though: he would never cease the frequent cigarette smoking, dangerous due to possible ignition, during his business hours".
57
This opinion might be considered a gauge of fruitful Polish-German scholarly collaboration, which could ignore the national resentments -and a fi rst-step success story in terms of 'moral conquest'.
Warschauer took over the management of all the archives within GGW, except for the Central Archives and the Warsaw School District archive. The latter had had fi les of Poland's top school offi ces stored since 1807, and in 1915 was made part of the reopened University of Warsaw. 58 The Such a system was diametrically different from the model functioning in the German Empire, whereby the resources had been put in the archive, since a hundred years ago, by provenance of sources (the place they were generated). 60 Hence, in line with the Russian manner, departmental archives functioned in Warsaw, including those related to courts-of-law, public prosecutor's offi ce, or fi nancial institutions.
61
Documents generated by the central public administration were stored at a former Jesuit college. The headquarters of the German Board of Archives housed a Treasury Archive whose collection featured items from the pre-Partition period. The fi les dating to Russian Partition time, 1815-1915, were kept at the archive of the General-Governor, in the Generalgouvernement building, the military documents being stored in the military archive at the Vladimir Fort. Lastly, the Central Archives (Archives of Historical Records of the Kingdom of Poland) housed a number of valuable dossiers deposited from other archives, along with the so-called Crown and Lithuanian Metricas. The latter mentioned Archive was supervised by a dedicated team of scholars, and was the only one whose internal structure resembled that of the German archives.
With the outbreak of the war, the Central Archives was the only such institution in Warsaw not to have ceased its operation. 61 The public prosecutor's offi ce was tasked with providing a legal protection of public property. Hence, the fi les deposited at the Archive of the Public Prosecutor Offi ce chiefl y consisted of documents confi rming the proprietary rights and taken advantage of in court trials and hearings. them, 62 remained at their posts, now with no emolument, though. 63 Under the altered regime, the Archive opened its doors again, 64 and resumed scientifi c activities at the year's end. 65 In contrast to the practices under the Russian rule, and in compliance with the standards binding in Prussia, the access was considerably facilitated. The institution thrived indeed: on a daily basis, at least ten historians pursued their queries there, 66 an attendance rate equal to that of large German archives. Rendering the archives commonly available, under the banner of mission civilisatrice, displayed by General von Beseler in Warsaw, marked a cultural breakthrough in Poland.
Yet, this development was clouded by the service relationship between Warschauer and Wierzbowski. Although the Pole was ready to acknowledge his subordination to the Governor-General, he would not report to Warschauer: Wierzbowski argued he was older and higher-ranking than him, and "held the title of Excellency". 67 As usual in such cases, the confl ict was fomented by vanity and ambition, though the titles of Professor and Privy State Counsellor did appertain to Wierzbowski. 68 His arguments fi nally convinced Beseler, which was not a doit on the part of the Governor but yet another proof of a conciliatory trend intended for the GGW. Beseler retained the status of Central Archives, and had Wierzbowski approved as an executive reporting directly to him, without Warschauer's supervision. 69 Moreover, the Governor assumed the cost of emolument for Polish members of the Archives staff 70 as well as the expenditure related to the edition of the academically prestigious series 'Monumenta Iuris'. 71 Before 1918, three volumes were published as part of the series in Polish, rather than in Russian, like before; a portion of copies of these publications appeared, for the fi rst time ever, in German libraries, archives, and scientifi c societies.
All this did not diminish the personal dissonance between Wierzbowski and Warschauer. The former, who seriously took into consideration a fast return of the Russians to Congress Poland, considering himself a subject of the tsar, had sent to Moscow some priceless original copies, including Teutonic Order fi les, before the Germans took over. 72 Inquired by German archivists about dispensing these documents, he replied evasively. Wierzbowski tended to avoid contacts with the Germans, 73 and allowed them access to the Central Archives only if accompanied by a Polish archivist.
III

MORALISCHE EROBERUNG IMPLEMENTED: THE ADMINISTRA-TIVE, SCIENTIFIC, AND POLITICAL-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE ARCHIVES BOARD'S ACTIVITIES
In order to avoid in the future any ambiguity with respect to the resources of Warsaw archives, Beseler ordained that all the collections taken over be made clear on the record, in a comprehensive fashion.
75 70 The extremely high salary Wierzbowski received under the Russian rule (7,000 roubles, of which 3,000 was the professor's wage and 4,000 was a special duty allowance as Archive Director) was taken over by the GGW authorities in its entirety; see Stebelski A lion's share of the defi cits included repertories and documents evidencing confi scations of Church properties. 76 The protection of the archival resources exercised by the German team saved a number of fi les from damage or, possibly, robbery. Apart from the archives within the GGW, the protection extended to the registries 77 and books left over unattended by the Russians, now weltering around in the edifi ces that earlier housed Russian administration agencies, or in private apartments leased by Russians. After these buildings or residential units were taken over by Germans or Poles, most of their new tenants had no idea about how valuable the Russian registries were.
There was one more reason behind the comprehensive protection applied to the entire archival resource in the GGW. Some Prussian offi cials and clerks, having established themselves in the General Government, did not resist the temptation to rob and confi scated documents, books, or works of art single-handedly. They considered their actions legitimate as they were mindful of the like practices of the arrogant and infl uential director of the Press Department with the GGW's Civil Board, Privy Counsellor Georg Cleinow, who had, for his part, successfully solicited an offi cial legitimisation for those dealings from General Erich Ludendorff, head of the Ober Ost administration. It was on his initiative, among other things, that Ober Ost ordered, in spring 1915, the Russian archive in Kielce to be hastily transported to Posen before the Austro-Hungarian authorities could refute this move. 78 But, a broad front was formed against the illegal evacuation of Polish cultural and art treasures to the Reich among the management team of the German civil administration headquarters in Warsaw, once the Board of Archives was enacted. Beseler banged his fi st on the table and ordained that the robbed Kielce archive be transported back to where it belonged. In parallel, he set forth a new legal framework for handling the local cultural heritage: by means of an ordinance, dated 23 November 1915, in reference to the Hague Convention, the Governor-General protected and secured the archives, 76 libraries, works of science, and monuments of art, thereby suspending the carte blanche afforded before to Cleinow by the Ober Ost. 79 Under another ordinance (of 3 April 1916), Beseler charged the German offi ces which have come into possession of the Russian registries with responsibility for their safekeeping. In the cases where these offi ces could not satisfy this requirement, the Board of Archives would provide assistance by depositing the documents in special fi reresistant rooms of the Polish Bank, received from Beseler. 80 The Board has also secured abandoned collections of books belonging to private persons or institutions, which oftentimes were regained afterwards by their previous owners. Interestingly, the German archivists were astonished at having learned that amidst the offi cial Russian books tons of 'miserable novelettes' could be found: apparently, the tsarist civil servants occupied their time at the offi ce reading the stuff.
81
Apart from protecting and stocktaking of the archival materials, the institution run by Warschauer made it available for scientifi c purposes. Contrary, however, to the practice applied by the Russians before 1915, with the doors of the archives being opened to the 'chosen few' for bribe, 82 the German Archives Board allowed broad access to archive collections. After all, one of the purposes behind the institution under discussion was to ensure the local scholars unrestrained access to the documents deposited in the archives, 83 and this certainly increased the effi ciency of historical research. On the other hand, this step has to be perceived, primarily, as modernisation of the archive-related practices previously prevalent in Poland -a process that was organically connected with Germany's mission civilisatrice in Congress Poland. 86 In August 1915, right after the German troops seized Warsaw, an eighty-plus years old servant named Ginter, veteran of the Russian-Turkish war, was found hidden at that same place. Born into a family of German colonists, the man spoke a fl uent German, Polish, and Russian, and thus was immediately employed with the archive. 87 The Treasury Archive stood out in the map of Warsaw archives, as its collection comprised almost one-and-a-half million of manuscripts, books, and cardboard-bound units, the oldest units being dated to late fi fteenth century -including books of account, assignation registers, sejm accounts, vetting records, or customs accounts. 88 The extensive manuscript legacy was a collection of sources (of a unique quality) of use in a fi scal history of Poland, from the Middle Ages till the Partition. Therefore, Polish historians responded enthusiastically to the unrestrained access to archival materials, especially that, in duly substantiated cases, they could import manuscripts from other archives via the Treasury Archive. With no attendance data available for the latter, the opening of a second reading room for researchers soon after the fi rst can be an indication. 89 Hipolit Grynwaser, who worked on his monumental work on the gentry democracy in early Poland (Demokracja szlachecka), 90 was among the very fi rst historians to use the Archive's collection almost on a daily basis.
Almost immediately after the opening of the Treasury Archive, Warschauer started to build a reference library, entrusting its management to his daughter Anna, a librarian by training. The collection of indispensable encyclopaedias, handbooks, and classical works, which were pretty scarce in Warsaw, was meant to meet the expectations of the Archives Board employees as well as Polish scientists willing to pursue their research with the Archive. 91 Warschauer's designs reached even further, as the library was to become a 'generative cell' for a future Prussian-German historical institute to emerge one day in Warsaw. The idea was begotten at Warschauer and Kehr's fi rst meeting in the late 1915 or early 1916. Well aware of the rank of the valuable archival material deposited in Warsaw and related to the history of Prussian provinces, both historians cudgelled their brains over how to extend the life of the Board of Archives after the war comes to an end. A historical institute formula seemed the most appropriate, all the more so that Kehr could take advantage of his experience from the years when he made the German Historical Institute in Rome fl ourish. 92 In line with this well-tested model, "German archivists were expected to carry out source-based queries in Poland, and offer assistance and support to German scholars arriving in this country to pursue historical research". 93 On a parity basis, the same rights would be vested in Polish historians active in Germany. The German-Polish scientifi c collaboration offer was high on Kehr's agenda. 94 He discussed concrete steps in view of forging the long-range idea into action during his sojourn in Warsaw in May 1917. 95 The planned deepening of contacts between German and Polish scientists and scholars was, in line with Karl Lamprecht's concept, a downright model instrument for 'fruit-bearing' foreign cultural policy focused on "winning friendly attitudes in foreign countries and contributing to a deeper mutual understanding". 96 the classical moral capture programme. Besides, the German offer of collaboration in historical research opened for the Polish historical science an opportunity to upgrade the management of the archives and popularise the collections through making them broadly available; in a pretty apparent manner, this trend implied admitting Poland to participate in the civilizational achievements of Western Europe by transmitting them by Germany to its younger partner as part of the mission civilisatrice trend. While Kehr's daring plans did not translate into action until the end of the German rule in Poland, Warschauer worked with unbelievable commitment (as Polish historian Kazimierz Kaczmarczyk emphasised after the war fi nished) on the development of the 'generative cell' for Warsaw's German Historical Institute project, amassing an impressive collection of some 300 key works covering the history of Poland and German-Polish relations, plus editions of source materials. Their previous editions had mostly been sold out and were considered 'white elephants', one example being the Monumenta Poloniae penned by August Bielowski. 97 Warschauer usually bought books from antique shops but would not resist bombing German librarians or historical societies in Germany with requests for dispensing duplicates kept in their collections and sending them over to Warsaw.
The the privilege. 100 All the Russian staff employed at the tame with the Archives, with their chief Nikolai Tsykin, escaped in the early days of August 1915; "One elderly servant stayed there, who guarded the dossiers with his Argusian eyes." 101 Warschauer offered this man to join the new team, and a salary. A more important move, though, was the consent he obtained from Beseler for entrustment of the management of the Archives of Historical Records to Maksymilian Baruch, a Pole; the Jewish background of both men, the German and his Polish colleague, might have had a say in this. It was only in early 1918 that Baruch was employed with the emerging Polish judiciary service and was replaced in the offi ce by Dr Recke, second in rank in the managerial team's hierarchy, who kept the post until the end of the occupation. When the Archives in question were made publicly available, it was visited by eight to ten persons per day, 102 which was an impressive number, given the context of the time. Apart from historians, Catholic priests were frequent visitors -a group that particularly suffered from the ban on access to the collection; now, they pursued queries in view of historical research or as indispensable for the ongoing handling of administration of their parishes. 103 After the setting up of the Regency Council in September 1917, high-ranked Polish tax offi cials sought answers to some of the most topical issues related to taxes or public property. Warschauer met them halfway and was cooperative in lending the documents they considered crucial, thus endearing respect among Polish historians. 104 The services rendered by the Archives were used by the occupational authorities as well. A number of their offi ces based in Warsaw subscribed on a regular basis for Warschauer's quarterly reports and, based on what was reported there, requested consulting or dispensation of fi les of use in resolving the ongoing administrative questions. Requests to the Archives' managers for clarifying genealogical issues came even from the Reich, mainly from noble families.
Warschauer's severest concern was how to duly protect and secure the military archive. Housed at the Vladimir Fort, which was a standalone and somewhat secluded facility, located virtually outside the city, the archive was tempting to thieves -not because of the value of its contents but as a load of wastepaper to make some money on. Night-time burglars would not be scared away by the sentry or by the protection walls: "like moles, they crawled into the site through underground corridors". The precious documents were eventually transported to the Treasury Archive.
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The professional protections, cataloguing, and civilised rules of rendering documents accessible, applied by the German Board of Archives: all this established modern standards in the archival art. Beseler's fl agship undertaking with respect to importation of German science to Poland, within the 'moral conquest' policy trend, seemed to have fulfi lled the hopes pinned on it.
IV FAILURE OF THE 'MORAL CONQUEST': WRESTLING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS TO PRUSSIAN FILES
There was more to the missionary zeal with which the German Board of Archives inventoried and catalogued the archival materials and records in the Generalgouvernement, though. The very fi rst queries confi rmed that some valuable sources related to the history of Prussia had been deposited in Warsaw archives; now, the size and importance of the collection found surpassed the German archivists' expectations. In the fi rst place, at the Central Archives as well as the Treasury Archives, Public Prosecutor's Archives and the Archives of Historical Records, they were discovering eighteenth-century documents generated by the administration of Prussia. In the Central Archives, Warschauer counted up 15,000 fi les or dossiers, with lesser amounts identifi ed in the other archives. 107 The search for fi les was pursued across the GGW, mainly in the former sites of Prussian administration, 108 and even in the adjacent Ludendorff 's empire, the Ober Ost. The civil administration was harnessed to join the action. 106 Once found, the documents were lent to the Archives Board for cataloguing. The result of the effort was discussed in three publications: (i) tracing the meandering vicissitudes of former Prussian registries; with a turn in the attitude of the Governor-General, who renounced his original legalistic stance and, from autumn 1917 onwards, showed increased understanding for the option to transfer the Prussian archives to Berlin. 117 Beseler was infl uenced by a growing frustration in face of the political demands of his Polish subjects and increasing sensitivity to the needs of the German minority in a Poland-to-be. 118 The 'moral conquest' project was rocking on its foundations as its fl agship aspect -the importation of civilizational achievements of German science -grew vulnerable as the Poles began guessing the intentions of their German partners. Polish archivists breathed down their German colleagues' necks. The climate in the archives cooled down substantially, and public recognition of Warschauer's scientifi c accomplishments faded amongst the Poles.
119
The collapse of the 'moral capture' policy in the GGW, as far as exporting German science to Poland went, was de facto announced by Beseler himself: He was the fi rst to have offi cially articulated the German claims with respect to the Prussian records, in reply to a request from the Polish archival management board. Beseler rendered his consent for supplying them with the archives and their collections (within the General Government) dependent on their meeting two conditions. 120 One was to form the (aforementioned) German historical institute, to be modelled after the Rome-based institution, in order for it to continue after the war the work initiated by the Archives Board, the Polish party being reassured that a corresponding institute would open in Berlin. The other postulate was for the two parties to come to an arrangement regarding the dispensation to the Germans of the records now deposited in Polish archives but once being property of the German-language countries forming the Hohenzollern empire. 121 This concerned, in particular, 117 See Lehr, 'Die "Rückforderung"', 53. 118 the central Prussian registries from after 1795, which, "in line with their provenance, form the Prussian, rather than a Polish, archival body".
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It was these records that were bargained over for the whole year 1918, until the last day of the German occupation, by Polish and German archivists. 123 The paradigm of the GGW authorities' behaviour and priorities was made apparent on this occasion: they aimed at discounting the asymmetric positions of the settling parties. As was the case with the other key negotiations with exponents of the (re-)emerging Poland -for granting the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession an ecclesial status, or ensuring school autonomy to the German minority in Poland to emerge -also this time the German authorities negotiated from a position of strength. Hutten-Czapski warned against this in his letter to Kehr: "I should consider disastrous the discounting of our strength in Warsaw."
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But his words turned into an ominous prophecy. The Germans resorted many a time to a strategy of strength and coercion; probably the most spectacular in this respect was their use of an argument derived from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (successful for them as it was), whereby the German Empire had taken over the rights to Russian property in its entirety, which extended to the archives deposited in Poland. The merits of this argument was clearheadedly described by Hutten-Czapski as a "pure nonsense". 125 Yet, a clarifying memo sent by the Count suffered the fate of similar warnings, nume rous as they have been in the history of mankind. If it ever reached the ears of the Berlin decision-makers, it was put aside and impressed them in no way, while the further history confi rmed the Count's words. This is how Beseler's 'moral conquest' programme fi nally collapsed in the sphere of science, for a successful strategy of seducing the weaker partner with a soft-power offer is based on making subtle suggestions that might generate acceptance (of these suggestions and of the seduction), rather than on using power to back him into a corner. The bargaining that headed for a blind alley was only interrupted by the fall of the Hohenzollern empire, Beseler's deposition as the ruler in Warsaw, and the dissolution of the German Board of Archives, 126 forcing a complete capitulation of its director. In the dramatic circumstances of the 11 November 1918 events, Warschauer transmitted all the archives into Polish hands. 127 A record co-signed by him and representatives of the Polish Ministry decided that each archive be provided to them separately.
The Poles really entered into possession of the archives by the handing in of the key and the fi xing on the entrance door of a bill reading 'The Archive of the State of Poland' [Archiwum Państwa Polskiego]. Adolf Warschauer, now the former Director of the Imperial German Board of Archives, left the Polish capital on 15 November 1918, travelling in a unheated freight wagon with a hand luggage and 1,000 marks of cash, 128 thus sharing in the lot of the numerous offi cers and servants of the German Civil Board.
V CONCLUSION
The protection and the stocktaking of the records was the merit of the Board of Archives; the standardised availability of archival resources to Polish researchers and unrestrained access to public archives marked an upgrade of the once-Russian archival system in Poland. These achievements are nowise diminished by the fact that the presence of a German managerial team in charge of the archives within the General Government enabled the German Empire to demonstrate its scientifi c power as a 'transmission belt' for the moralische Eroberung programme.
Yet, the export of the German model of archival system into Poland by way of the imperial Board of Archives being installed in Warsaw, all in order to increase the superpower's prestige and 126 After the GGW's Civil Board was dissolved in December 1918 and all the archives provided to the re-established Poland, the German Board of Archives was to stay in Warsaw "for some time", which probably meant the end of 1919, in order to help complete all the publications then still in statu nascendi; see BABerlin, RdI, no. 119685, 193 ff., 'Die Aufl ösung der Archivverwaltung, Bericht Adolf Warschauers' [no date specif.]. 127 For an account of the course of the day, see Warschauer, Deutsche Kulturarbeit, 316.
128 Ibidem, 317.
legitimacy of the authority it wielded, was combined by the occupiers with the activity that served their particular interests in Congress Poland: namely, laying claims with respect to the archives of Prussian origin, stored therein at the time. This did not, as yet, annihilate the 'moral conquest' scheme as far as importation of German science and organisation to Poland was concerned. The fi nal episode was marked by the course of the bargaining over the disputable documents, where the German party negotiated from a position of strength. As was proved by the developments of 11 November 1918 in Warsaw, the German occupational authority was prone to put the Polish party on an equal footing in the rights to the archives only when its own position started swaying and creaking most dangerously. Germany's 'civilizational mission' ended where it collided against the country's own particular interests: the paradigm of action which, appearing in the other areas of Beseler's policy in the GGW, was at odds with the 'moral conquest' project, did correspond, all in all, with the superpower's colonial perspective against a subordinate country. Thus, in the GGW -similarly to what happened during the German-Polish bargaining for autonomy for the German school system in the reborn Poland, or the negotiations for the status of the Lutheran Church 130 such was the guiding slogan for Beseler. Kehr explained this in a rather expected fashion: in dubious situations, Prussian interests take prevalence over Polish interests. Therefore, Kehr, Beseler, and the Prussian Ministry of Interior would not resist using force in the dispute on the succession of archival goods.
The fi erce Polish-German dispute over the takeover of Prussian registries was, paradigmatically, an inherent element of succession of archives between the collapsing multiethnic monarchies and the nation-states emerging out of them after the First World War. As a matter of fact, it was part of a broader phenomenon that relativised the fi erceness of the German-Polish wrestling. Austria and Hungary were involved in strenuous negotiation for their archives, which they had shared after 1867. The compromise they came to (the Badener Archivabkommen, 28 May 1926) provided that the archives remain, indivisible, in Vienna but opened an opportunity for a common heritage of both countries (patrimoine intellectuel), with Hungary allowed to manage and use it. 131 As for Czechoslovakia, Austria had to transfer to it the archives with records related to Czechoslovak statehood. 132 Comparing, however, the methodology applied by the GGW authorities against the Nazi practices in Poland twenty years later, one identifi es a shocking divide between them -including in the micro-area of management of archives and cultural goods amassed in them. 133 During the Second World War all the Prussian registries were deported to Berlin without ceremony. As opposed to those most distressing days, the activities of the imperial Board of Archives in the First World War years was based on (however limited) collaboration between German and Polish archivists. Not on equal footing, they would nonetheless sit at a shared table and discuss things. Twenty years later, Polish archivists were not even admitted to the table; almost thirty eventually lost their lives. 134 The Nazis relied on decretive lawlessness whereas the GGW authorities, in the years 1915-18, respected the international law.
This difference refl ects a broader phenomenon: insofar as the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the emergence of national, state-related, or imperial identity in Europe, 135 the totalitarian systems completely denied these developments in the 1930s and afterwards. 136 
